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This article examines the historical origins of the Inter-American human 
rights system and key achievements of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights over the past fifty years. It explores the Commission’s use 
of on sight visits and country reports to expose human rights violations of 
military governments during the 1970s and its increased use of the case 
system since the restoration of democratic rule in the 1990s. The article 
also notes how shifts in US foreign policy toward the region impacted the 
Commission’s work. It concludes by noting certain obstacles and challenges 
currently faced by the Commission.
I. INTRodUCTIoN
The year 2009 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (Commission) and the thirty-first 
anniversary of the entry into force of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (American Convention) and the creation of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights (Court). Although the Commission is neither as old, nor as 
*  Robert K. Goldman is Professor of Law & Louis C. James Scholar and Co-Director, Center 
for Human Rights & Humanitarian Law, American University Washington College of Law. 
He was a member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights from 1996 to 2004 
and its President from February 1999 to March 2000. 
    I am greatly indebted to Diego H. Alcala Laboy, Esq. and Matias Hernandez, Esq., my 
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well known for its accomplishments as the European Court of Human Rights 
or the former European Human Rights Commission, no regional human rights 
body has continuously had to cope with more crises and endemic problems 
in more countries than has the Commission and, to some extent, the Court. 
Indeed, if the saving of lives and the securing of broad reparations to victims 
are appropriate measurements of the effectiveness of any such supervisory 
bodies, then arguably no other system has been more successful than the 
Inter-American system. 
This article traces the historical origins of the Inter-American human 
rights system and identifies some of the conflicting policies that helped 
shape it. The article also focuses on various notable activities and achieve-
ments of the Commission during three discreet periods between 1960 and 
2004. In addition, it briefly notes key themes and shifts in US foreign policy 
toward the region and how they impacted the Commission’s work. The 
article concludes by examining certain obstacles faced by the Commission 
in discharging it mandate.
II. oRIGINS of THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
The persistent intervention of the United States into the domestic affairs of its 
Latin American neighbors in the early part of the twentieth century stimulated 
Latin American efforts to establish a regional public order system based on 
the principles of non-intervention and the sovereign equality of states. Early 
efforts in support of human rights were directed primarily toward this goal. 
One commentator has noted that “[t]he apparent readiness to overlook the 
inherent contradiction between the international protection of human rights 
and the regional doctrine of non-intervention has been a familiar and no-
table characteristic of Inter-American conferences and of the work product 
of regional juridical bodies. When the contradiction was perceived at all, it 
was some time resolved in favor of the doctrine of non-intervention.”1
Expressions of commitment to the protection of human rights were com-
mon in the early Inter-American conferences and occasionally were embodied 
in agreements concerning civil and political rights. For example, the Third 
Pan American Conference of 1906 approved the Convention Establishing 
the Status of Naturalized Citizens who Again Take up Their Residence in 
the Country of Their Origin. The Sixth International Conference of American 
  1. José Cabranes, The Protection of Human Rights by the Organization of American States, 
62 Am. J. Int’l l. 889, 892-93 (1968). See also thomAs BuergenthAl & DInAh shelton, Pro-
tectIng humAn rIghts In the AmerIcAs: cAses AnD mAterIAls (4th rev. ed. 1995); scott DAvIDson, 
the Inter-AmerIcAn humAn rIghts system (1997); the Inter-AmerIcAn system of humAn rIghts 
(David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998).
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States, held in Havana in 1928, approved the Convention on the Status of 
Aliens and the Convention on the Right to Asylum. 
The Good Neighbor Policy, proclaimed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
in his inaugural address of 1933 put Latin America on notice that unilateral 
intervention would no longer be the operative principle of US diplomacy in 
the region. At the Seventh International Conference of American States held 
later that year, the United States and the Latin American republics ratified the 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which declares: “No state has 
the right to intervene in internal or external affairs of another.”2 The Confer-
ence also approved conventions on Political Asylum and on Extradition. In 
1936, at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, the 
American states again affirmed their collective commitment to the principle 
of non-intervention by adopting a protocol declaring the inadmissibility of 
any form of intervention, regardless of the reason.3 The Conference also 
approved a resolution on the Duties and Rights of Women with Respect 
to Problems of Peace. In 1938, the American states convened in Lima and 
adopted two significant resolutions concerning Freedom of Association and 
Freedom of Expression for Workers and Defense of Human Rights. It was 
not until the end of World War II, however, that concern for human rights 
became the subject of regional as well as worldwide attention. 
The American states began shaping an incipient regional program for 
the protection of human rights at the Inter-American Conference on Prob-
lems of War and Peace, the so-called Chapultepec Conference, convened 
in 1945 to consider the postwar directions of the Inter-American system. 
The participants adopted a resolution on the International Protection of the 
Essential Rights of Man that stated in part:
International protection of essential rights of man would eliminate the misuse of 
diplomatic protection of citizens abroad, the exercise of which has more than 
once led to the violation of the principles of non-intervention and of equality 
between nationals and aliens, with respect to the essential rights of man.4
The language of the resolution highlights the intent of the states to strengthen 
the doctrine of absolute non-intervention. 
The Conference assigned the Inter-American Juridical Committee (IAJC) 
the task of drafting a convention on the International Rights and Duties of 
Man for submission to an International Conference of American Jurists.
  2. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Seventh International Conference of American 
States, signed 26 Dec.1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, in The International Conferences 
of American States 121-23 (1st Supp. 1940).
  3. Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention, Inter-American Conference for the 
Maintenance of Peace, signed 23 Dec.1936, 51 Stat. 41, T.S. No. 922, in The Interna-
tional Conferences of American States 129 (1st Supp. 1940).
  4. Resolution XL, in Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-
American Conference on Problems of War and Peace 108 (1946).
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The goal of the Latin American republics to establish non-intervention 
as an authoritative principle of the region’s public order was finally realized 
by the signing of the Charter of the Organization of American States5 at the 
Ninth International Conference of American States held in Bogotá in 1948. 
Articles 19 and 21 of the Charter restate the 1933 and 1936 declarations 
in the following language:
Art. 19: No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indi-
rectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other 
State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other 
form of interference or attempted threat against its political, economic, and 
cultural elements.
Art. 21: The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even tem-
porarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another 
State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions 
or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion 
shall be recognized.6
Another essential tenet of the new Inter-American system was expressed 
in the preamble of the Charter: “[T]he true significance of American soli-
darity and good neighborliness can only mean the consolidation on the 
continent, within the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of 
individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights 
of man.”7
III.  THE AMERICAN dECLARATIoN of THE RIGHTS ANd dUTIES of 
MAN
Consistent with the preamble of the Charter and the declarations of the 
Chapultepec Conference, the American States signed on 2 May 1948, the 
world’s first major international document on human rights, the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration),8 
which preceded the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights by seven 
months.
Reflecting natural law theory, the American Declaration asserts that the 
fundamental rights of man “are not derived from the fact that he is a national 
  5. Charter of the Organization of American States, adopted 30 Apr.1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 
199 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 13 Dec. 1951).
  6. Id. 
  7. Id.
  8. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted 2 May 
1948, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American 
System, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V//II.82, doc.6 rev.1, at 17 (1992). 
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of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of his human personality.”9 
The international protection of these rights “should be the principal guide 
of an evolving American law” and strengthened “as conditions become 
more favorable.”10
The document enumerates civil and political as well as economic and 
social rights. The civil and political rights largely restate those already guaran-
teed in the constitutions of most American states. Among these are the rights 
to equality before the law, to due process of law, of petition and assembly, 
to religious freedom and worship, to protection from arbitrary arrest, and 
to the inviolability of the home. In contrast, the economic and social rights 
proclaimed therein had not been the objects of legislative prescription or 
judicial protection in many of the American republics. The most significant 
of these rights are: right to the preservation of health and to well-being; to 
the benefits of culture; to work and to a fair remuneration for work; to leisure 
time, to wholesome recreation, cultural, and physical benefit. The American 
Declaration also proclaims affirmative duties or standards of conduct which 
are meant to guide individuals in their societal relations. Among these are: 
the duty to receive instruction; to vote; to obey the law; to serve the com-
munity and the nation; to work; and to pay taxes.
Despite their noble statement, the American states chose not to make 
the American Declaration binding on its signatories, nor did they create 
any machinery to promote, much less protect, the rights they had just pro-
claimed. The Conference instead passed a resolution recognizing the need 
for an Inter-American Court to protect these rights and requested the IAJC 
to draft a statute for such organ. The IAJC politely declined the invitation 
on the ground that it was premature to do so and that it “would involve 
a radical transformation of the constitutional systems in all the American 
countries”11 and also advised the Inter-American Council of Jurists that the 
preparation of a binding agreement on human rights should precede the 
statute of the proposed court. 
Consideration of the statute was postponed until 1953 when the Council 
of Jurists asked the Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) if it 
would be appropriate to place the matter of the statute on the agenda of the 
Tenth Conference. The OAS Council, reflecting the views of the IAJC, felt that 
the time was not yet ripe to discuss the proposed statute. In the meantime, 
further development on human rights were still ongoing as evidenced by 
the approval of new resolutions on Improvement of the Social, Economic, 
  9. Id.
 10. Id.
 11. Appendix III, Inter-American Juridical Committee, Report to the Inter-American Council 
of Jurists concerning Resolution XXXI of the Bogotá Conference, in Pan American Union, 
Human Rights in the American States, at 166 (1960).
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and Cultural Levels of the Peoples of the Americas and The Strengthening 
and Effective Exercise of Democracy by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs at 
the Fourth Meeting of Consultation in 1951.
The Tenth Inter-American Conference, held in Caracas in 1954, did 
nothing to implement the American Declaration but discussed measures 
tending to promote human rights, without detriment to national sovereignty 
and the principle of non-intervention. The American states approved resolu-
tions on Racial Discrimination, Universal Suffrage, and The Strengthening of 
the System for the Protection of Human Rights. Reaffirming the American 
states’ commitment to the rights enunciated in the American Declaration, 
the Conference urged its constituency to “adopt progressively measures to 
adjust their domestic legislation to the Declaration” and to take appropriate 
measures “to ensure the faithful observance of these rights.”12 The Confer-
ence asked the Council of the OAS to continue studying the juridical as-
pects of regional protection of human rights and the feasibility of creating 
an Inter-American Court to protect them. The Council delegated the matter 
to its Juridical Committee and its Subcommittee on Human Rights, where 
no further action was taken until political events propelled the matter to 
the forefront. 
In 1959 the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers was con-
vened in Santiago, Chile to consider the political unrest in the Caribbean, 
followed by the Sixth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs which met in 
1960 to hear Venezuela’s charge that the Dominican Republic’s dictator, 
Rafael Trujillo, had attempted to have Venezuela’s president assassinated.
It was at these Conferences that the American states shed their apathy 
toward human rights problems and began to shape a regional program for 
their protection. José Cabranes noted that
[t]he alleged external terrorist activities of the Trujillo regime began to turn the 
O.A.S. toward the view that violations of human rights and denials of demo-
cratic freedoms within member states might affect the peace of the Americas 
and might thus become a proper concern of the Organization. It is important 
to stress, however, that it was the Dominican regime’s alleged violation of the 
non-intervention doctrine itself that first prompted the O.A.S. to examine its role 
in promoting respect for human rights.13
Taking note of the wholesale disregard of fundamental liberties in Trujillo’s 
country, the 1959 Conference stressed the interrelationship between the 
deprivation of human rights and the existence of anti-democratic regimes. 
The Foreign Ministers proclaimed this concern in the Declaration of Santiago 
 12. Id. Appendix IV, Resolution XXVII, Strengthening of the System for the Protection of 
Human Rights, at 170.
 13. José Cabranes, Human Rights and Non-Intervention in the Inter-American System, 65 
mIch. l. rev. 1147, 1164 (1967).
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which states that “the harmony among the American Republics only can 
be effective as long as respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and the exercise of representative democracy are a reality in the internal 
workings of each of them.”14 The Ministers, thereupon, passed a two-part 
resolution entitled Human Rights. Part I entrusted the Inter-American Court of 
Justice (IACJ) with the task of drafting a convention(s) establishing a regional 
court and other machinery to protect these rights, while Part II called for the 
creation of an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights having “the 
specific functions that the Council [of the OAS] assigns to it” and “charged 
with furthering respect of such rights.”15
In May-June 1960, the Council of the OAS approved the statute of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Under the statute, the Com-
mission is “an autonomous entity”16 of the OAS whose function is to promote 
respect for human rights as set forth in the Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man. The Commission was assigned the following functions and 
powers in Article 9 of its Statute:
(a) To develop an awareness of human rights among the peoples of America;
(b)  To make recommendations to the governments of the member states general, 
if it considers such action advisable, for the adoption of progressive measures 
in favor of human rights within the framework of their domestic legislation 
and, in accordance with their constitutional precepts, appropriate measures 
to further the faithful observance of those rights;
(c)  To prepare such studies or reports as it considers advisable in the perfor-
mance of its duties;
(d)  To urge the governments of the member states to supply it with information 
on the measures of human rights;
(e) To serve the O.A.S. as an advisory body in respect of human rights.17
The Commission would consist of seven members, all nationals of OAS 
member states, “of high moral character and recognized competence in 
the field of human rights.”18 Its members are elected for four-year terms by 
the governments of the member states and may be re-elected for one ad-
ditional term.
 14. Final Act, Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Santiago, Chile, 
Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser. C/11.5, at 3 (1960).
 15. Id. at 10-11.
 16. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, adopted 25 May 1960, 
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/I.1 (1960).  
 17. Id. art. 9.
 18. Id. 
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IV.  THE bACkGRoUNd of THE AMERICAN CoNVENTIoN oN 
HUMAN RIGHTS
As previously mentioned, the American Declaration was merely a non-
binding statement of moral obligations. In view of the widespread denial of 
fundamental liberties in many American states, the OAS realized that moral 
obligations are best observed when translated into binding legal obligations. 
As discussed in 1959, the Foreign Ministers at the Fifth Meeting of Con-
sultation assigned the IACJ to draft a binding convention on human rights 
including the instrumentalities for their protection. However, compared with 
the rapid development of the Inter-American Commission, the elaboration 
of the American Convention proceeded slowly.19 
The IACJ undertook the assignment and approved at its Fourth Meeting 
in Santiago on 8 September 1959, a draft convention on human rights for 
adoption at the Eleventh Inter-American Conference. Its draft enumerated 
substantive economic, social, and cultural rights as well as civil and political 
rights. Because of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Inter-American Conference was 
not held in 1961, and consideration of the draft convention was postponed 
until the Second Special Inter-American Conference that met in November 
1965 in Rio de Janeiro. There it was decided to send the draft convention 
and alternative drafts submitted by Chile and Uruguay to the Council of the 
OAS. The Council was instructed to receive the views of the Commission 
and other interested bodies on the draft and prepare a final draft by 1966 for 
submission to a specialized conference on human rights in March 1967. 
After reviewing the IACJ draft, the Commission suggested to the OAS 
Council that the economic, cultural, and social rights, except those rights 
concerning labor unions, be deleted. It also recommended the deletion of 
provisions on permanent sovereignty over natural resources and self-deter-
mination. The Commission stated that it was inappropriate to reaffirm and 
include such rights and principles in a convention on human rights. Instead, 
it suggested the inclusion of general provisions calling upon member nations 
to adopt domestic means to implement and further these rights.
Consideration of the new draft convention was postponed in 1967, once 
again, by a new development. The General Assembly of the United Nations, 
on 16 December 1966, approved the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, and an Optional Protocol to the latter covenant. By the end of 
September 1967, the first covenant was signed by Costa Rica, Colombia, 
Honduras, El Salvador, and Uruguay, and the second, by the same countries 
 19. American Convention on Human Rights, signed 22 Nov. 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1979) (entered into force 
18 July 1978). 
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and Ecuador. (By the end of 1970, however, only Costa Rica, Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Uruguay had ratified the covenants.) Noting this action by 
member states and the similar substantive rights proposed in the IACJ draft 
and the UN covenants, but different institutional machinery to protect these 
rights, in May 1967, the OAS Committee on Legal and Political Affairs alerted 
the OAS Council of the possibility of conflict between the worldwide and 
regional programs aimed to protect human rights. Accordingly, it suggested, 
and the Council concurred, that further consideration of the IACJ draft be 
deferred until member states were consulted. The Council then submitted 
the following two questions to member states:
1.  Whether the governments of the American states, in approving, at the Twenty-
first Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Resolutions A, 
B, and C, concerning the international covenants on human rights, wished to 
establish a single universal system of regulation of human rights; or whether 
on the contrary they contemplated the possibility of the coexistence and co-
ordination of the worldwide and regional conventions on the same rights.
2.  Whether, in the latter case, those governments consider that the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights provided for in Article 112 of the Protocol of 
Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States should 
be limited to establishing an inter-American institutional and procedural sys-
tem for the protection of those rights that would include the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights and, eventually, an Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights.20
Of the twelve states replying to the first question, ten—including Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, the United States, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela—expressed their opinion in favor of “the coexistence 
and coordination” of the UN covenants and an Inter-American convention. 
Only two countries, Argentina and Brazil, deemed it inadvisable to continue 
drafting a regional convention in light of the UN actions. In response to the 
second question, however, only five states—Ecuador, Guatemala, Venezuela, 
Colombia, and Costa Rica—advocated that the proposed convention should 
include procedural rules as well as substantive principles. Chile and Uruguay, 
on the other hand, stated that the Convention should provide only for the 
creation of an institutional and procedural system. Chile took the position 
that to avoid conflict between the two systems, the Inter-American machin-
ery should apply only substantive law approved by the United Nations. 
The United States and Mexico took no definitive position on this question. 
The United States equivocated in its response, stating that the American 
 20. Permanent Council, Report on a Consultation with the Member States Regarding the Draft 
Convention on Human Rights, submitted by the Committee on Juridical and Political 
Affairs, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.G/IV Rev. 3, 4 (1967). 
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Convention should not necessarily be limited to institutional and procedural 
articles, although this might be a satisfactory approach.21 In view of the 
possible conflict between the UN covenants and the IACJ draft, the United 
States indicated that it could make an informed judgment on the matter if 
a study comparing the substantive provisions of the UN covenants and the 
various Inter-American conventions were made available to member states. 
The Secretariat of the Commission undertook these studies and concluded 
that both systems could coexist.22 Specifically, it stated:
The need for, and the desirability of, a regional convention for the Americas 
are based on the existence of a body of American international law built up in 
accordance with the specific requirements of the countries of this hemisphere. 
That need and desirability also follow from the close relationship that exists 
between human rights and regional economic development and integration, 
in accordance with the statements of the Chiefs of State made at the meeting 
in Punta del Este.
Consequently the Inter-American Convention on the Protection of Human Rights 
should be autonomous rather than complementary to the United Nations cov-
enants, although it should indeed be coordinated with those covenants.23
Despite the failure of many American states to respond to either question 
and the obvious reluctance of many of those responding to support a sepa-
rate regional system to protect substantive rights, in 1968 the OAS Council 
asked the IACJ to prepare a final text of the draft convention for submission 
to member states and adoption at a Special Inter-American Conference to be 
held in San Jose, Costa Rica during November 1969. The Special Conference 
finally approved the American Convention on Human Rights, also called 
the Pact of San Jose, that November.24 The American Convention entered 
into force in 1978 after eleven states ratified it.
V. THE AMERICAN CoNVENTIoN oN HUMAN RIGHTS
The American Convention with its substantive guarantees and institutional 
machinery is perhaps the most ambitious and far-reaching instrument of 
 21. Comparative Study of the United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and of the Draft, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.19, doc. 18, at 10 (1968).
 22. Id. See also Comparative Study of the United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Draft, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/II.19, doc. 26 (1968).
 23. Comparative Study of the United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Draft, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/II.19, doc. 26, at 3 (1968).
 24. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 19. 
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its kind ever developed by an international body.25 It considerably widens 
the scope and content of the 1948 American Declaration by the inclusion 
of more elaborate and specific civil and political rights. The organs for the 
protection of these rights in the American Convention parallel, in large mea-
sure, the institutional machinery of the European Convention. The American 
Convention provides for a Commission, which replicates the existing body 
and a purely jurisdictional organ, the Court. Unlike its European and UN 
counterparts, the American Convention incorporates both the rights guar-
anteed and their means of protection. 
The entry into force of the American Convention effectively created a 
dual system for protecting human rights throughout the hemisphere. The 
American Convention became the primary source of the human rights ob-
ligations of state parties thereto, while the American Declaration and the 
OAS Charter continued to define the human rights obligations of those states 
not parties to the American Convention. The Commission, under its Statute 
and Regulations, is empowered to receive petitions and decide cases lodged 
against both kinds of states. However, it can only refer cases to the Court 
that are directed against states that have ratified the American Convention 
and have expressly accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.
It is from its far-reaching nature that the American Convention derives 
both its strengths and weaknesses. The creation of a regional machinery to 
supervise domestic implementation of American Convention based rights 
seemed to suggest at the time that the doctrine of non-intervention was 
waning in the human rights area. Recognition of the right of individuals to 
make claims regarding violations of human rights certainly constituted a 
step toward the goal of vesting individuals with juridical personality under 
international law. Additionally, the existence of such agreements helped to 
promote regional and global awareness of efforts undertaken for the pro-
tection of human rights and thereby strengthened the efforts of domestic 
proponents supporting such measures.
It is clear, however, that at the time of its drafting, the American Con-
vention guaranteed many civil and political rights which, although en-
shrined in domestic law, were largely ignored by the governments of many 
hemispheric countries. In this sense the American Convention essentially 
prescribed maximum, not minimum, human rights. Moreover, the framers 
of the American Convention largely transposed or projected a whole set of 
values and attitudes toward the law that were not widely entrenched in Latin 
America. The American Convention, as conceived and propounded, was 
surely more readily adoptable to nations with well developed, stable legal 
institutions and a political culture that cherished and upheld the rule of law. 
For example, the states that drafted and approved the European Conven-
 25. Id.
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tion were mostly genuine liberal democracies with strong and independent 
judiciaries. Their purpose in elaborating that convention was to strengthen 
and preserve existing rights, rather than to create new rights. The experience 
of Latin America stands in stark contrast.
Despite their nominal commitment to constitutional democracy, many 
Latin American states had histories of vacillating between authoritarianism 
and rather unsuccessful experiments in democracy. Professors Henry Steiner 
and Philip Alston have observed:
The development of the inter-American system followed a different path from that 
of its European counterpart. Although the institutional structure is superficially 
very similar and the normative provisions are in most respects very similar, the 
conditions under which the two systems developed were radically different. 
Within the Council of Europe, military and other authoritarian governments have 
been rare and short-lived, while in Latin America they were close to being the 
norm until the changes that started in the 1980s. 
The major challenges confronting the European system are epitomized by is-
sues such as the length of pre-trial detention and the implications of the right 
to privacy. Cases involving states of emergency have been relatively few. The 
European Commission and Court have rarely had to deal with completely 
unresponsive or even antagonistic governments or national legal systems, or 
with deep structural problems that led to systematic and serious human rights 
violations. . . . By contrast, states of emergency have been common in Latin 
America, the domestic judiciary has often been extremely weak or corrupt, 
and large-scale practices involving torture, disappearances and executions have 
not been uncommon. Many of the governments with which the Inter-American 
Commission and Court have had to work have been ambivalent towards those 
institutions at best and hostile at worst.26
VI.  THE CREATIoN of THE INTER-AMERICAN CoMMISSIoN oN 
HUMAN RIGHTS: ITS PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES bETwEEN 1960 ANd 
1973
Even in its formative years, the Commission attempted rather vigorously to 
promote and protect human rights in the Americas by examining individual 
complaints, making recommendations, and preparing reports concerning 
flagrant violations of these rights. As the late Professor Durward V. Sandifer, 
an early member of the Commission, observed: “With no other sanction 
than publicity, the Commission has effectively established its role of guard-
 26. henry steIner & PhIlIP Alston, InternAtIonAl humAn rIghts In context: lAw, PolItIcs, morAls 
869 (2d ed. 2000). See also Thomas Buergenthal, The American and European Conven-
tions on Human Rights: Similarities and Differences, 30 Am.u. l. rev. 155 (1980). 
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ian and critic, a substantial gloss on the jealously guarded doctrine of non-
intervention.”27
For example, at its first session in 1960, the Commission broadly inter-
preted its authority under its statute as permitting it to make general recom-
mendations to each, as well as to all member states concerning the adoption 
of progressive human rights measures within the framework of their domestic 
legislation.28 In a related matter, the Commission determined that it was not 
empowered to rule on petitions filed with it by individuals or groups alleging 
human rights violations by member states. Nevertheless, it determined that 
it could take cognizance of such petitions by way of information. However, 
the uncertainty surrounding this interpretation of its competence prompted 
the Commission to request the OAS Council to make explicit those powers 
it had implicitly carved out for itself.
In 1965 the OAS passed Resolution XXII, which called for expanding 
the Commission’s functions and powers. Accordingly, the Commission’s 
statute was amended in 1966 to include Article 9(bis) which formally em-
powered it
[t]o examine communications submitted to it and other available information; 
to address the government of any American state for information deemed per-
tinent by the Commission; and to make recommendations, when it deems this 
appropriate, with the objective of bringing about more effective observance of 
fundamental human rights.
The revised statute, Article 9(bis)(a), also requested the Commission to pay 
“particular attention” to observing the following human rights referred to 
in the American Declaration of 1948: right to life, liberty, and personal se-
curity; equality before the law; religious freedom; freedom of investigation, 
opinion, expression and dissemination; right to fair trial; protection from 
arbitrary arrest; and to due process of the law. In addition, Article 9 (bis)(c) 
requested the Commission
[t]o submit a report annually to the Inter-American Conference or to the Meeting 
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which should include: (i) a state-
ment of progress achieved in realization of the goals set forth in the American 
Declaration; (ii) a statement of areas in which further steps are needed to give 
effect to the human rights set forth in the American Declaration; and (iii) such 
observations as the Commission may deem appropriate on matters covered in 
the communications submitted to it and in other information available to the 
Commission.
 27. Durward V. Sandifer, Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 11 how. l.J. 508, 
521-22 (1965).
 28. Report on the Work Accomplished During its First Session, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. 
Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/III.1, doc. 32, art. 9-10 (1961).
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Certainly, some of the Commission’s early priorities and activities were 
shaped in part by the realities of the Cold War and by the agenda that the 
United States was pushing within the political organs of the OAS, which 
the United States effectively dominated at the time. With the advent of the 
Cold War, US Latin American policy underwent significant transformation. 
The Roosevelt administration’s Good Neighbor Policy was replaced in the 
1950s by a policy that sought to contain the spread of communism in the 
hemisphere. Accordingly, the United States began providing a variety of 
support to numerous authoritarian regimes with questionable human rights 
practices on the ground that they were bulwarks against communist expan-
sion. Thus, despite its formal espousal of non-intervention and support for 
human rights, the United States began to intervene, militarily and otherwise, 
in the domestic affairs of those Latin American states it deemed sympathetic 
to communist ideologies. 
For example, in 1954 the CIA engineered the overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz 
Guzmán, Guatemala’s left leaning President, and succeeded in replacing him 
with a pro-American, rightist regime. In 1962, after the Bay of Pigs, the Eighth 
Meeting of Consultation, at the urging of the United States and its supporters, 
declared that the principles of Marxist-Leninism were incompatible with the 
Inter-American system and that “the alignment of . . . a government with 
the communist bloc breaks the unity and solidarity of the Hemisphere.”29 
Shortly thereafter, Castro’s government was expelled from the OAS. In 1965, 
President Johnson dispatched US forces without prior consultation with the 
OAS to the Dominican Republic with the ostensible purpose of rescuing 
US nationals endangered by civil strife. He subsequently clarified that the 
real goal of the US intervention was to help prevent the establishment of 
another communist government in the hemisphere.30 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the condition of human rights in Cuba 
was an early priority of the Commission and has remained the object of 
the Commission’s scrutiny since 1961. At that time, the Commission began 
receiving numerous petitions denouncing the inhuman treatment accorded to 
political prisoners by Cuban authorities. In 1962, the Commission requested 
the government’s permission to visit and to supply relevant information 
concerning these denunciations. The Cuban government did not respond to 
either request. Thereafter, the Commission detailed human rights violations 
in Cuba in three reports published in 1962, 1963, and 1967.31
 29. Part One, Resolution II of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
Affiars, (22-31 Jan. 1962), Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. available at http://avalon.law.
yale.edu/20th_century/intam17.asp. 
 30. Statement by President Johnson, 52 DeP’t st. Bull. 740, 747 (1962).
 31. Informe sobre la Situación de Derechos Humanos en la República de Cuba, Inter-
Am.C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.4, doc. 2 (1962); Informe sobre la Situación de 
los Presos Políticos y su Familiares en Cuba, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V
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The Commission also published two reports in 1963 and 1969, regarding 
charges of repeated human rights violations in Haiti.32 In 1962 and 1964, it 
addressed communications to the Haitian government asking for informa-
tion concerning these charges and requested permission to hold sessions 
in that country. The government refused to cooperate with the Commission, 
denouncing its requests for information as intervention in its domestic af-
fairs. During this period, the Commission investigated and published reports 
concerning human rights violations in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, 
Paraguay, and Nicaragua, for its own use.33 Undoubtedly, the Commission’s 
most notable success in this period occurred during its extraordinary mission 
to the Dominican Republic in 1965.34
Following the US intervention in the Dominican civil strife of 1965, 
the Foreign Ministers of the American states decided to create and send an 
Inter-American Peace Force whose purpose was to restore normal conditions 
and to uphold the human rights of the people in the Dominican Republic. 
Shortly thereafter, the Secretary General of the OAS asked the Commission to 
visit Santo Domingo to investigate numerous charges of human rights viola-
tions lodged by rival factions contending for power. From the time it arrived, 
the Commission played an active and important role in the peacekeeping 
operations. It helped protect the lives of innocent bystanders, negotiated 
mutual prisoner releases, and secured the release and safe-passage from 
the country of various political leaders. The Commission, at the invitation 
of the Provisional Government of the Dominican Republic, remained in the 
country to observe and report on the presidential election held in June of 
1966. This historic mission marked the genesis of the in loco visit by the 
Commission to OAS member states. 
In recognition of these efforts and others designed to protect human 
rights, the American states at the Third Special Inter-American Conference, 
held in Buenos Aires in 1967, made the Commission “a principal organ” of 
the OAS by signing a Protocol of Amendment to the Organization’s Charter.35 
Two years later, the Commission once again became actively engaged in 
protecting human rights under difficult circumstances.
   II.7, doc. 4 (1963); Informe sobre la Situación de Derechos Humanos en la República 
de Cuba, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.17, doc. 4 (1967).
 32. Informe sobre la Situación de Derechos Humanos en Haití, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. 
Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.8, doc. 5 (1963); Informe sobre la Situación de Derechos Humanos 
en Haití, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.21, doc. 6 rev. (1969).
 33. See Organization of American States, Country Reports, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. 
available at http://www.cidh.org/pais.eng.htm.
 34. Report on the Activities of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the 
Dominican Republic, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.13, doc.14 rev. 
(1965).
 35. Tom Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicorn, 
Not Yet an Ox, 19 hum. rts. Q. 510, 515 (1997).
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Prior to the outbreak of hostilities between Honduras and El Salvador in 
July 1969, each state had requested that the Commission send a mission to 
its territory to investigate charges of atrocities committed against its nationals 
within the borders of the other state. The Commission immediately appointed 
a subcommittee to visit both countries to investigate the acts denounced. 
From 4-10 July 1969, the Subcommittee interviewed officials and private 
parties and received complaints from both governments. When hostilities 
erupted between the two countries on 14 July the Commission, at the re-
quest of El Salvador and other American states, sent the Preliminary Report 
of its Subcommittee to the Thirteenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, which had convened to consider the crisis. The Commission 
continued to study the situations in both countries and recommended that 
both governments adopt appropriate procedures to ensure effective remedies 
to those injured and to protect against future human rights violations.36
In the early 1970s, the Commission began expressing concern over in-
creasing and destabilizing acts of violence frequently perpetrated by non-state 
actors. Specifically, in its 1971 Annual Report, the Commission denounced 
terrorist acts within member states as “a massive crime that tends to create a 
climate of insecurity and anxiety, on the pretext of bringing about a greater 
degree of social justice for less-favored classes.”37
The Commission also began urging member states to streamline judicial 
proceedings so that accused persons could be tried without undue delay. In 
addition, it stressed that penal systems should be improved so that prisons 
would fulfill their purpose of rehabilitation and that prisoners not endure 
inhuman and degrading treatment. The Commission similarly called for states 
to ensure that everyone have access to education, noting that illiteracy had 
actually increased throughout the Americas in recent years.
Most importantly, the Commission began to stress the link between the 
effective exercise of democracy and respect for human rights—a theme that it 
has continuously reiterated to this day. Taking note of the political instability 
in the Americas in the early 1970s, it warned rather presciently, that unless 
countries began to address and solve the root causes of this problem, efforts 
to protect human rights would be largely ineffective.
VII. CoMMISSIoN ACTIVITIES fRoM 1973 To THE EARLY 1990S
It is worth recalling that when the American Convention was being negoti-
ated in the mid 1960s, most OAS member states, despite their pronounced 
 36. Informe sobre la situación de Derechos Humanos en El Salvador y Honduras, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 9 rev. (1970). 
 37. Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1971, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.27, doc. 11 rev. (1972).
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institutional weaknesses, did have nominally democratic and freely elected 
governments. However, by the time the American Convention entered into 
force in 1978, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay, as well 
as several Central American states, were ruled either by coupist military re-
gimes or weak civilian governments under military tutelage. Many of these 
regimes, facing leftist insurgents or other violent groups, instituted policies 
that violated the most basic human rights and norms of international hu-
manitarian law. Systematic murder, torture, and disappearances; proscription 
of political parties, unions, and student groups; and the censorship of the 
media, were among their most common emblematic practices. Furthermore, 
many of these regimes, particularly in South America, were particularly 
zealous advocates of the doctrine of national security and justified their 
actions, which amounted to state sponsored terrorism, as necessary to win 
the so called “Third World War” against international communism at home 
and abroad. 
These regimes consistently labeled local and foreign based NGOs that 
denounced their excesses to the Commission as apologists for subversion. 
Human rights advocacy in the1970s through the late 1980s thus became 
identified by many elites throughout the Americas as a kind of leftist ideol-
ogy which, in turn, had the unfortunate effect of tainting and politicizing 
the subject. Indeed, many of these governments regarded the Commission’s 
inquiries into and eventual exposure of their illicit practices as providing 
aid and comfort to their internal enemies. 
For its part, during the 1970s and 1980s, the United States, with the 
notable exception of the Carter administration, pursued policies throughout 
the hemisphere that further helped to politicize the effort to promote respect 
for human rights. This was especially the case during the Reagan administra-
tion. By largely viewing human rights through the prism of the Cold War, 
Reagan’s government supported many of the worst human rights violators 
in the hemisphere based on their avowedly anti-communist credentials. In 
furtherance of its policy to confront and “bleed” the Soviet Union and its 
putative proxies throughout the world, it armed, financed and/or backed the 
counter-insurgency efforts of the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Honduras, as well as the Nicaraguan insurgents, despite their abysmal 
human rights practices. It is little wonder that many in the hemisphere 
came to identify human rights not as a body of protective legal rules and 
procedures, but rather as a tool of US foreign policy that was perceived as 
being selectively and often inconsistently applied. At the same time, while 
more states in the region edged toward ratifying the American Convention, 
the United States declined to do so. These realities need to be understood 
in order to appreciate the complex environment in which the Commission 
operated during this period.
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Perhaps the Commission’s foremost achievement during this difficult 
period of authoritarian rule was its preparation and publication of country 
reports that evaluated the human rights practices of governments throughout 
the region, especially in Southern Cone countries.38 Particularly noteworthy 
in this regard were its 1974, 1976, and 1977 reports on Chile;39 its 1978 
reports on Paraguay and Uruguay;40 and its 1980 report on Argentina.41 
Several of these reports were the result of in loco visits by the Commission, 
while others were written at the Commission’s own initiative because the 
states denied it permission to visit. Tom J. Farer, a member of the Commis-
sion during this period, aptly described the Commission’s role thusly: “it 
converted itself into an accusatory agency, a kind of “Hemispheric Grand 
Jury,” storming around Latin America to vacuum up evidence of high crimes 
and misdemeanors and marshalling it into bills of indictment in the form of 
country reports for delivery to the political organs of the OAS and the court 
of public opinion.”42 These reports and in loco visits significantly enhanced 
the Commission’s credibility, visibility, and prestige throughout the region. 
Undoubtedly, the Commission’s visit to Argentina in 1979 was its most 
successful in terms of results.43 Arriving in Buenos Aires at the height of 
the de facto regime’s “dirty war,” the Commission received the testimonies 
of thousands of persons, including relatives of the disappeared and other 
victims of the regime’s excesses. The Commission’s 1980 report chronicled 
and exposed the systematic nature of the human rights violations being 
perpetrated by that country’s military government.44 The report’s publication 
has been widely credited in Argentina as having helped decrease the number 
of reported disappearances. Outside the hemisphere, the report was relied 
upon by governments and intergovernmental bodies in Europe in shaping 
their policies toward Argentina.
During this period, the individual petition system was not widely known 
outside of the Southern Cone and, hence, not that frequently used by victims 
 38. See Farer, supra note 35 for an insightful discussion of the Commission’s activities dur-
ing the late 1970s and early 1980s by a former president of that body. See also cecIlIA 
meDInA, the BAttle for humAn rIghts: gross, systemAtIc vIolAtIons of humAn rIghts AnD the 
Inter-AmerIcAn system (1988).
 39. Report on the Status of Human Rights in Chile, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.34, doc. 21 corr. 1 (1974); Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights 
in Chile, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.37, doc. 19 corr. 1 (1976); Third 
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.40, doc. 10 (1977).
 40. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Paraguay, Inter-Am. C.H.R. O.A.S., Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.43, doc. 13 corr. 1 (1978); Report on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Uruguay, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.43, doc. 19 corr. 1 (1978).
 41. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.49, doc. 19 corr. 1 (1980).
 42. Farer, supra note 35, at 512.
 43. Report on the Situation on Argentina, supra note 41. 
 44. Id.
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of human rights violations from other parts of the hemisphere. Moreover, 
when the Commission did open cases, many governments either disputed 
the facts or simply refused to cooperate with the Commission by ignoring 
its requests for information.45 Consequently, decisions finding violations of 
rights under the American Declaration or the American Convention did 
not constitute a significant part of the Commission’s work until the 1990s. 
This does not mean, however, that the Commission did not render some 
very important and innovative merits decisions. For example, its decisions 
that found the amnesty measures in Argentina and Uruguay violative of the 
American Convention were truly ground breaking and gave impetus to the 
global movement against impunity.46 In addition, in early 1986 the Com-
mission, fortunately, broke with its past practice and began submitting cases 
to the Inter-American Court.
VIII.  CoMMISSIoN ACTIVITIES fRoM THE EARLY 1990S To THE 
PRESENT
The late 1980s marked the end of most authoritarian regimes throughout 
the region. By the early 1990s all OAS member states had freely elected 
governments except for Cuba. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of 
the Cold War and the armed conflicts in Central America, and the emergence 
and strengthening of civil society institutions throughout the hemisphere 
seemed to bode well for enhancing respect for human rights at the national 
and regional levels. At the same time, the Clinton administration maintained 
a less ideological and more multilateralist approach in its policies toward 
the region than had the two previous administrations. Although it continued 
 45. Farer, supra note 35, at 528. “[W]hile European cases almost always presented issues 
of law, in Inter-American ones it was almost invariably the facts which were disputed. 
No government claimed that torture and summary execution were permissible even in 
states of emergency; they simply denied torturing and killing.” “Occasionally, certain 
governments absolutely failed to respond [to the commission’s request for information 
regarding petitioner’s claimed violations] no matter how often prodded and were finally 
subjected to the time limit and the presumption of truth set by the Commission’s Regu-
lations.” Tom Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer 
a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, in the Inter-AmerIcAn system of humAn rIghts 31, 48 (David J. 
Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998).
    Indeed, because many governments, particularly de facto military regimes, compro-
mised the already fragile independence of the civilian judiciary by the wholesale purge 
of judges and/or transferring jurisdiction from civilian to military courts to try suspected 
“subversives,” the Commission excused petitioners from exhausting domestic remedies 
and in effect became a court of first instance where petitioners could press their human 
rights claims against the offending state. 
 46. Consuelo v. Argentina, Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309, 10.31, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., Report No. 28/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14, corr.1 (1992-93); Mendoza 
v. Uruguay, Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374, 10.375, 
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 29/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14, corr. 1 (1992-93).
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supporting past policies to isolate Castro and to eradicate coca production 
in the Andean region, it undertook new initiatives to improve the rule of law 
and democratic institutions in Latin America by promoting judicial reform 
and anti-corruption measures. It also took a far more aggressive approach in 
pursuing US economic interests throughout the region, insisting on market 
liberalization as a condition of external financial assistance. In addition, it 
strongly supported the work of the Commission and the Court within the 
political organs of the OAS.
Within the region, a number of states emerging from years of authoritar-
ian rule took certain symbolic and important steps to break from the past. 
Truth Commissions were established in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, and 
eventually Guatemala. Moreover, among the first acts of the newly elected 
governments of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay were to ratify the American 
Convention and accept the Court’s contentious jurisdiction. By the mid 1990s, 
the governments of Mexico and Brazil for the first time invited the Commis-
sion to carry out on site visits to evaluate the human rights situation in both 
countries, and, in 1998, they both accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. 
During this period, several states, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and 
Mexico, also began to design national human rights plans, which were in 
part shaped by the jurisprudence of the Commission and the Court.
Another rather immediate consequence of the new political conditions 
throughout the region was a substantial increase in the number of petitions 
filed with the Commission seeking redress for past violations under authori-
tarian rule. Although the newly elected governments in the region no longer 
violated human rights as a matter of state policy, it soon became apparent 
from the nature of other complaints received that many countries had deep 
seated structural deficiencies and/or endemic problems, such as police 
violence, racial and other forms of discrimination, exclusion of vulnerable 
groups from meaningful political participation, and inefficient, corrupt, or 
weak judiciaries. Moreover, and disturbingly, a significant number of these 
new complaints, echoing the past, detailed violations of fundamental rights, 
such as the right to life and freedom from torture. 
Realizing that these problems and deficiencies, unless remedied, could 
undermine democratic institutions and respect for human rights, the Com-
mission, in the early 1990s, began to closely monitor those countries with 
the most fragile democratic institutions and/or which were still experiencing 
political violence. The situations in Guatemala and Haiti were particularly 
worrisome in this regard. Apart from periodic visits to both countries, the 
Commission published four reports on the human rights situation in Haiti 
between 1990 and 199547 and three reports on Guatemala between 1993 
 47. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.77, doc. 18 rev.1 (1990); Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, 
Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 18 rev. 1 (1993); Report on the
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and 2001.48 Colombia and Peru, which were, at the time, the only coun-
tries in the hemisphere with ongoing internal armed conflicts, also received 
special attention, albeit for different reasons.49 
Despite protracted internal hostilities and failed negotiations with dis-
sident armed groups that have controlled at times large portions of national 
territory, Colombia has had relatively strong democratic institutions, regular 
elections, a free press, and governments that have largely cooperated with 
and sought advice from the Commission and other inter-governmental bodies. 
Since the late 1990s, the Commission’s concerns in Colombia have primarily 
focused on the close links between the country’s security forces and vari-
ous paramilitary groups, extreme violence both within and outside of the 
context of the armed conflict, the plight of millions of internally displaced 
persons, the use of military courts to shield members of the security forces 
from responsibility for serious human rights violations, attacks against human 
rights defenders, and a pervasive culture of impunity reflecting the inability 
of law enforcement authorities and the civilian judiciary to investigate and 
punish virtually all kinds of criminal conduct.
In light of the country’s endemic violence and civil strife, the Commis-
sion’s top priority during this period was to try to save the lives of as many 
persons as possible who were under serious threat of harm from state agents, 
their proxies, and other violent actors. To this end, the Commission issued 
numerous precautionary measures requiring the government to take concrete 
actions to protect hundreds of human rights defenders, labor union lead-
ers, and reporters, as well as members of indigenous and Afro-descendant 
communities and large groups of internally displaced persons. While not 
always effective, these measures, which Colombia’s Constitutional Court 
has declared binding on the state, unquestionably have helped save the 
lives of innumerable persons. More recently, the Commission has closely 
monitored the legal measures and process that have lead to the demobi-
lization of some of the country’s most notorious paramilitary groups. The 
   Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85, 
doc. 9 rev. 1 (1994); Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.88, doc. 10 rev. (1995).
 48. Fourth Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. 
Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 16 rev. (1993); Special Report on the Human Rights Situ-
ation in the so-called “Communities of Peoples in Resistance” in Guatemala, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.86, doc. 5 rev. 1 (1994); Fifth Report on the Situation 
of Human Rights in Guatemala, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 
21 rev. (2001).
 49. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 31 (1993); Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru, 
Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 59 rev. (2000); Second Report 
on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.84, doc. 39 rev. (1993); Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Colombia, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1999).
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Commission has also regularly visited Colombia. For example, it undertook 
on-site visits in 1990, 1992, and 1997. Based on the information gathered 
during its 1997 visit, the Commission published in 1999 a major report on 
the human rights situation in Colombia in which for the first time it used 
international humanitarian law, i.e., the law of armed conflict, to identify 
the legal regime governing the ongoing internal armed conflict and to detail 
emblematic violations of international humanitarian law attributable to state 
security forces, paramilitary groups, and dissident armed groups alike.50 Fur-
thermore, it is worth noting that Colombia in the 1990s enacted legislation 
that streamlined procedures for its compliance with Commission recom-
mendations regarding the payment of monetary compensation to victims 
of human rights violations. In addition, the country’s Constitutional Court, 
the most progressive in the hemisphere, has issued numerous innovative 
opinions and orders that have protected the effective exercise of basic rights 
enshrined in the American Convention. 
The nature and tenor of the Commission’s relations with the Fujimori 
government in Peru were quite different. After his “self-coup” in April 1992, 
which shut down the legislature and effectively purged judicial personnel 
involved in every aspect of the administration of justice, President Fujimori 
made various commitments to the OAS concerning the prompt restoration of 
democracy. Unfortunately, the political organs of the OAS did little to hold 
him to those undertakings. The Commission soon began receiving a flood 
of complaints detailing violations of fair trial guarantees in connection with 
the application of Peru’s anti-terrorist legislation. Other petitions tended to 
reveal systematic violations of the right to life, including disappearances, 
the right to humane treatment, the right to personal liberty, and freedom 
of expression. 
Because the government refused to settle cases or adopt the Commission’s 
recommendations where it had found violations, the Commission began 
referring to the Inter-American Court cases that were most emblematic of 
the Fujimori government’s illicit practices. In response, Peru spearheaded—
unsuccessfully—several initiatives within the political organs of the OAS 
supposedly to “strengthen” the region’s human rights system, but whose 
real purpose was to dramatically curb, if not gut, the supervisory powers 
of the Commission. Furthermore, in 1999, Peru attempted to withdraw its 
declaration of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction to avoid litigating sev-
eral high profile cases. Although the Court found Peru’s putative withdrawal 
to be without effect and thereafter proceeded to decide these cases51 and 
 50. Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia, supra note 49. 
 51. See Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia, supra note 49; 
Bronstein v. Peru, Case 11.762, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 20/98, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, 
doc. 6 rev. (1997); Constitutional Court v. Peru, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 55 
(24 Sept. 1999).
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other cases against Peru, Fujimori’s government continued to defy the Court 
by ignoring its orders and decisions. In the face of that defiance, the OAS 
remained largely passive despite its role as the ultimate guarantor of the 
integrity of the human rights system.
In 1998, the Commission effectively maneuvered Fujimori into invit-
ing it to conduct an on-site visit to Peru, and, based on that visit and other 
material, it prepared a comprehensive report on the human rights situation. 
Although the report was completed in early 2000, the Commission decided 
not to release it until 4 June 2000 on the eve of the OAS General Assembly 
meeting in Windsor, Canada in order to have maximum media exposure 
and impact on the organization.52 
The strategic release proved successful as the report’s findings dominated 
the discussions during the General Assembly. The report meticulously de-
tailed the progressive destruction of the rule of law and democracy during 
Fujimori’s tenure and contained a challenge to the OAS to act by pointedly 
stating that the recent presidential election, whereby Fujimori was elected 
to a third term, was “an irregular interruption of the democratic process.” 
This time, the political organs of the OAS rose to the occasion by requiring 
the Fujimori government to take a series of measures that most certainly 
influenced Fujimori’s decision to resign the presidency in disgrace several 
months after the publication of the report. 
The Commission’s overall work on Peru during the Fujimori era showed it 
at its best. Not since its visit to and reporting on Argentina in the late 1970s 
had the Commission been so effective in its efforts to expose rank lawlessness 
in an OAS member state. By utilizing all the tools at its disposal, including 
exercising its “diplomatic/political” role within the OAS, the Commission, 
together with the Court, was not only able to mete out justice in individual 
cases, but also through its public reporting to act as an “early warning” 
mechanism which kept the region as a whole informed of things that were 
going terribly wrong in an important hemispheric state.
Another country which merits special mention is Argentina. Since the 
restoration of democracy in 1983, Argentina has done more than any other 
hemispheric state to squarely confront and break with the legacy of its au-
thoritarian past. Specifically, it annulled the military’s self-amnesty law, cre-
ated the National Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP), prosecuted 
members of the military juntas, and enacted a broad reparations scheme for 
victims of the military regime’s human rights violations. In addition, apart 
from ratifying the American Convention, Argentina in 1994, as part of its 
constitutional reform, accorded constitutional rank to that treaty. This, in 
turn, has resulted in Argentine judges at all levels regularly applying the 
 52. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru, supra note 49.
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Court’s and the Commission’s jurisprudence in assessing the compatibility 
of national laws with the American Convention.
This period also marked the beginning of a rather unique pattern of 
cooperation between successive Argentine governments and litigants with 
the Commission in the use of the friendly settlement mechanism estab-
lished in the American Convention. Indeed, in 1993 Argentina pioneered 
the use of this mechanism for resolving litigation before the Commission in 
the case of Guillermo Birt, et al.53 Thereafter, every Argentine government 
has entered into at least two such settlements with the assistance of the 
Commission. Many of these settlements were quite innovative in that they 
recognized a new right under domestic law, for example, the right to the 
truth concerning the disappeared in the Lapaco case54 or required the state 
to change its domestic law by eliminating the crime of contempt from the 
criminal code in the Verbitsky case.55 Additionally, many other Argentine 
cases, which were not so settled, presented sophisticated questions of first 
impression whose resolution contributed greatly to the development of the 
Commission’s jurisprudence, especially on due process and related issues. 
Moreover, Argentina has been in the forefront of those OAS member states 
that have consistently opposed periodic attempts to curb the Commission’s 
powers, and thereby weaken the region’s human rights system. 
During this same period, human rights NGOs, which were flourishing 
and proliferating throughout the region, began filing numerous petitions 
posing new and novel legal claims involving, women’s rights, freedom of 
expression, indigenous people’s rights, environmental rights, labor rights, 
HIV/AIDS, and other economic, social, and cultural rights. Their efforts were 
certainly spurred on by the entry into force of the Inter-American Convention 
on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women 
(Convention of Belem Do Para)56 and the Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Protocol of San Salvador)57 in 1995 and 1999, respectively.
 53. Report on the Friendly Settlement Procedure in Cases 10.288, 10.310, 10.436, 10.496, 
10.631, and 10. 771, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 1/93, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14, 
corr. 1 (1992-93).
 54. Augiar de Lapacó v. Argentina, Case 12.059, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 21/00, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. (1999).
 55. Verbitsky v. Argentina, Case 11.012, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 22/94, OEA/Ser.L/V.88, 
doc. 9 rev. 1 (1994).
 56. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence 
Against Women (“Convention of Belem Do Para”), adopted 9 June 1994, 24th Sess., 
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.92 doc. 31 rev. 3 (1994) (entered into force 5 Mar. 1995), 
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1534 (1994).
 57. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”), adopted 7 Nov. 1988, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 69 (entered into force 16 Nov. 1999), reprinted in Basic Documents 
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 
doc.6 rev.1 at 67 (1992). 
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By the mid-1990s, despite holding regular elections and the existence 
of freer and more open societies, many states, most particularly in South 
America, began experiencing severe economic problems and a sharp dete-
rioration in the functioning of democratic institutions, which helped spark 
attempted coups and other means to achieve regime change. If such attacks 
on the constitutional order were not yet entirely a thing of the past, the OAS 
at least began to take action to repudiate them. Resolution 1080,58 excluding 
coupist regimes from the OAS, and the 2001 Inter-American Democratic 
Charter59 make clear that coups are no longer acceptable to the Organiza-
tion and its member states. Consistent with these positive developments, the 
Commission began playing close attention to the conflictive political situation 
in Venezuela, especially since the attempted coup against President Chavez 
in April 2002. In March 2003, the Commission published a comprehensive 
report on Venezuela that analyzed the reasons for the highly polarized 
political climate in that country and its negative impact on human rights 
protections.60 It has also closely followed the situations in Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, and Haiti. 
The region’s human rights system suffered something of a setback in 1998 
when Trinidad and Tobago formally denounced the American Convention. 
This unprecedented action was largely taken in response to the Commis-
sion’s examination of numerous petitions alleging that Trinidad and Tobago’s 
imposition of the mandatory death penalty in all capital cases violated numer-
ous provisions of the American Convention. The Commission’s preliminary 
reports in 199961 and the Court’s 200262 judgment confirmed these viola-
tions. In 1999, the Trinidadian government also executed several persons 
in direct contravention of binding orders issued by the Court. However, the 
OAS’s political organs did nothing. Although the Commission has rendered 
comparable decisions on the use of the mandatory death penalty by other 
Caribbean states, none of these states has followed Trinidad and Tobago’s 
example. Hopefully, Trinidad will decide to re-accede to the American 
Convention in due course. 
As a result of the increased number of petitions received, the Commis-
sion made resolution of cases its top priority during this period. Many of 
the Commission’s decisions since the mid 1990s consolidated existing juris-
 58. Represenative Democracy, adopted 5 June 1991, AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-O/91), 21st Sess., 
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.P/XXI.O.2 (1991).
 59. Resolution of San Jose, Costa Rica Inter-American Democratic Charter, adopted 5 
June 2001, AG/RES. 1838 (XXXI-O/01), 31st Sess., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.P/XXXI-O.2 
(2001).
 60. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Venezuela, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 4 rev. 2 (2003).
 61. See, e.g., Hilaire v. Trin. & Tobago, Case 11.816, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 43/98, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, doc. 6 rev. (1998).
 62. Hilaire v. Trin. & Tobago, 2002 Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94 (21 June 2002).
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prudence or broke new ground in such diverse areas as amnesty laws, the 
death penalty, military justice, anti-terrorism measures, fair trial guarantees, 
indigenous peoples’ rights, rights of disabled persons, and labor rights. In 
addition, the number of friendly settlements brokered by the Commission in 
recent years has increased dramatically. These settlements, which the Commis-
sion routinely offers to litigants generally after declaring a petition admissible 
and opening a case, offer an attractive alternative to protracted litigation 
before the Commission and the Court. As previously noted, they frequently 
have resulted in highly creative and generous reparation measures for broad 
categories of victims of human rights abuses. As such, they have become a 
significant, albeit very time consuming, activity of the Commission.
This new emphasis on cases has not been to the detriment of in loco 
visits and the preparation of country reports. These continue to be an im-
portant part of the Commission’s work, particularly with respect to those 
countries experiencing armed conflict or serious institutional problems, 
such as Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, and Venezuela. However, “working” 
visits in recent years by the Commissioner and staff member responsible 
for the country have supplanted to some degree the more cumbersome and 
expensive on-site visit by the entire Commission. It can be expected that 
future country visits and ensuing reports, instead of examining the “global” 
human rights situation in the country concerned, will be far more focused 
by addressing and formulating recommendations concerning very specific 
human rights practices. The Commission’s recent country report on Haiti63 
published in April 2007 and the various thematic reports on access to jus-
tice64 are indicative of this trend.65 
During the 1990s, the Commission considerably expanded the number 
of its Special Thematic Rapporteurships either at its own initiative or in re-
sponse to requests from NGOs and the political organs of the OAS. These 
rapporteurships have not only spotlighted public attention on the plight of 
certain vulnerable groups or obstacles to the free exercise of certain key 
rights, but also have lead to new standard setting in the field. The work 
of these mechanisms also has enriched and reinforced the Commission’s 
more general monitoring of human rights practices in the countries visited. 
 63. Observations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights upon Conclusions 
of its April 2007 Visit to Haiti, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Serv.L/V/II.131, doc. 
36 (2008).
 64. Access to Justice as a Guarantee to Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Review of 
the Standards Adopted by the Inter-American System of Human Rights, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.129, doc. 4 (2007); Report on the Implementation of Justice and Peace 
Law: Initial Stages of the Demobilization of the AUC and First Judicial Proceedings, 
Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.129, doc. 6 (2007).
 65. Justicia e Inclusión Social: Los Desafíos de la Democracia en Guatemala, 2003, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2003); Report on the Situation 
of Human Rights in Venezuela, supra note 60.
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As of 2009, the Commission had Special Rapporteurs for the rights of the 
child, women, indigenous peoples, internally displaced persons, migrant 
workers, prison conditions, Afro-descendents and against racism, and 
freedom of expression. Reflecting its concern about the growing number 
of attacks on human rights workers in the region, in 2001 the Commission 
established within its Executive Secretariat the Human Rights Defenders 
Functional Unit. This unit regularly evaluates the situations of at risk human 
rights workers and organizations and recommends to the Commission the 
issuance of precautionary measures to protect these persons and groups 
from irreparable harm. Many of these thematic mechanisms are supported 
by voluntary financial contributions from OAS member states, the Inter-
American Development Bank, or various European aid agencies. Assuming 
an infusion of additional resources to support these rapporteurships, it is 
most likely that working visits by these thematic mechanisms to member 
states will increase dramatically.
By the close of the 1990s, the so-called decade of transition to democ-
racy in the region had ended. It is clear that initial hopes for consolidating 
democratic institutions and the rule of law, which are indispensable for 
protecting human rights at the local level, fell well short of expectations 
in many nations. Progress, however, has been made in certain areas. The 
people of the region are now far more knowledgeable of their entitlement 
to basic human rights and how to seek legal redress from the Commission. 
Moreover, they have shown themselves to be far less tolerant of official cor-
ruption and generally expect far more transparency and accountability from 
their elected representatives than they had in the past. In addition, various 
governments, most notably in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, have recently 
taken new steps to fight impunity and come to grips with the divisive lega-
cies of the past. 
As previously indicated, changes in governments and their policies, 
as well as changing political and economic conditions in the region, have 
presented new challenges to the Commission over the years. In this regard, 
there are certain challenges and obstacles facing the Commission and the 
Court that merit special attention and are discussed below. 
IX. CHALLENGES ANd obSTACLES
Without question, the single greatest obstacle to the effective functioning of 
the Commission and the Court is the lack of adequate human and financial 
resources. Simply put, the system of petitions and cases is in imminent 
danger of collapse. The Commission’s thirty staff lawyers, who are pres-
ently handling nearly 1,250 open cases, cannot keep pace with the annual 
increase in the number of petitions and thus cannot meet the reasonable 
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expectations of states and victims for their prompt resolution. The annual 
average number of petitions received between 1997 and 2001 was 609.66 
The Commission received 1,456 new complaints in 2007, an approximate 
70 percent increase in a ten-year period.67 
The situation of the Court is even more precarious. As a result of the 
Commission’s reform of its regulations in 2001, whereby presumptively 
all cases are now referred to the Court, that body’s thirteen staff lawyers 
cannot be expected to deal with the fifty-plus current cases and over sixty 
provisional measures on its docket, much less with the anticipated referral 
of fifteen to twenty new cases a year from the Commission.
Although the Commission is the OAS’s principal organ in the area of 
human rights, its budget represents less than 4.6 percent of the organiza-
tion’s total budget. It is important to understand that the commissioners and 
the judges of these organs are not salaried employees of the organization. 
Instead, they receive an honoraria and a per diem when they are in ses-
sion or engaged in other official activities. Approximately two-thirds of the 
Commission’s total budget goes to staff salaries and benefits. The remainder 
is barely adequate to cover the costs of two regular sessions, publication 
of the annual and special reports, and the costs of performance contracts. 
This means that the budget contains no money for a single in loco visit or 
for litigating a single case before the Court. In order to carry out these and 
other mandated activities, the Commission has had to rely on the voluntary 
contributions from the United States and various European countries. For its 
part, the Court has received funds from the European Union to help cover 
the costs of its publications. It is clear that without additional resources, 
neither organ will be able to continue carrying out many of the tasks en-
trusted to them. As the OAS is an organization in perpetual financial crisis, 
the prospects of increased funding are quite bleak.
The failure of most state parties to the American Convention to adequately 
implement that instrument’s rights and guarantees under domestic law or to 
fully comply with orders and decisions of the Commission and Court have 
also adversely affected the functioning and integrity of the system. It is a 
frequently overlooked fact that the primary responsibility for implementing 
the American Convention rests with the states parties themselves. Under the 
American Convention, states parties not only pledge to secure to all persons 
subject to their jurisdiction the free exercise of the rights and freedoms 
recognized in that instrument, but also undertake to accord domestic legal 
effect to, as well as harmonize their interpretations of domestic rules with 
 66. Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2002, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2003), at Ch. III.B.
 67. Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2007, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.130, doc. 22 rev. 1 (2007), at Ch. IIIB. 
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those rights and freedoms. As a corollary, they may have to modify and 
perhaps even derogate any domestic legal norm that is incompatible with 
their obligations under the American Convention. States parties are similarly 
required to provide effective judicial remedies to all persons claiming viola-
tions of these rights and freedoms. 
It is therefore quite troubling that the Commission has routinely en-
countered many instances where states parties have not made Convention 
based rights operative under domestic law or where judges have applied 
norms of domestic law in contravention of their state’s engagements under 
the American Convention. Clearly, if such rights are not recognized under 
domestic law, there can be no effective domestic remedies to redress their 
violation. Fortunately, various states have taken certain measures to remedy 
this situation. For example, some states, such as Argentina and Peru, directly 
incorporate provisions of the American Convention into domestic law, while 
others, such as Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala have constitutions 
which accord supremacy to the American Convention and other human 
rights treaties over domestic law. 
It is worth noting that the record of state party compliance with Commis-
sion and Court decisions relating to the payment of monetary compensation 
to victims of human rights violations has improved when compared to the 
period of authoritarian rule. However, no state has yet put in place internal 
legal mechanisms and procedures that mandate full compliance with the 
decisions and orders of the Commission and the Court. The great majority 
of states parties regularly plead res judicata or prescription under domestic 
law as excuses for their failure to comply with orders and decisions requiring 
them to identify, prosecute, and punish state agents responsible for human 
rights violations. As a consequence, impunity for such violations continues 
to be the norm throughout the region. This in turn undermines the credibility 
and efficacy of the system.
If the region’s human rights system is to be fully effective, then mem-
ber states of the OAS must take seriously their role as the collective and 
ultimate guarantors of the system’s integrity. It is quite revealing that the 
political organs of the OAS generally showed greater willingness to take 
initiatives supporting Commission decisions when dictatorships held sway 
in the region than they have in the last decade under freely elected gov-
ernments. As noted previously, these organs did absolutely nothing when 
the governments of Peru and Trinidad and Tobago were openly defying the 
Commission and the Court. It was only after the fall of Fujimori in 2002 that 
several member states began presenting various proposals to establish an 
annual review procedure by the General Assembly and Permanent Council 
of the OAS to assess compliance with Commission and Court decisions. 
However, despite ongoing debate, the OAS has not yet created any kind of 
mechanism for this purpose. Consequently, when it revised its regulations 
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in 2000, the Commission included a new provision whereby it can adopt 
the follow-up measures it deems appropriate, such as requesting information 
from litigants and holding hearings, in order to verify compliance with its 
decisions. Further, it introduced in its 2001 Annual Report a new chapter 
that depicts the status of compliance with its recommendations in cases 
decided and published during the previous two years.68 It is worth noting 
that within the Council of Europe, noncompliance with decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights is subject to sanctions, including exclu-
sion from the regional system. 
Another challenge for the Commission is the need to develop a coher-
ent strategy for dealing with economic, social, and cultural rights. Although 
the Protocol of San Salvador entered into force in 1999 and the Commis-
sion has dealt with these rights in its country reports and various cases, it 
has not yet fully articulated its views concerning the justiciability of these 
rights under the American Declaration and the American Convention.69 
Backsliding throughout the region in the protection of basic civil and politi-
cal rights, which has required very time consuming scrutiny and action by 
the Commission, largely accounts for this. However, substantial cutbacks 
in social spending in many countries, combined with increased awareness 
of economic, social, and cultural rights, have generated new and difficult 
cases that the Commission will have to address in a more comprehensive 
manner than it has in the past.
Terrorism has been a rather commonplace feature in Latin America and 
has presented significant challenges to the Commission over the past fifty 
years. Consequently, the Commission has acquired considerable expertise 
in dealing with the subject. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s the Com-
mission’s reports analyzed and exposed state sponsored terrorism being 
perpetrated by the military regimes in the Southern Cone. In the 1980s and 
1990s anti-terrorist legislation and related counter-insurgency measures in 
Guatemala and Peru were priority concerns of the Commission. Since the 
1990s, it has closely scrutinized comparable laws and practices in Colom-
bia. Although states are the primary focus of its mandate and activities, the 
Commission has repeatedly condemned terrorist acts perpetrated by private 
persons or dissident armed groups. In recognition of the threat that terrorism 
poses to democracy and the protection of human rights, the Commission 
has consistently affirmed the right and duty of states to protect their citizens 
from terrorist violence. At the same time, it has recognized that the people 
of the region must be protected against disproportionate state responses to 
such violence. 
 68. See Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2001, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114, doc. 5 rev. (2002), at Ch. III.
 69. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 57. 
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As a result of the Bush administration’s legislative and other initiatives in 
the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the Commission real-
ized that it had to provide guidance to OAS member states on how to craft 
anti-terrorism and related measures so that they do not run afoul of their 
international legal obligations. Accordingly, in late 2002, the Commission 
published its comprehensive Report on Terrorism and Human Rights.70 This 
several hundred page report was the result of twelve months of intensive 
study and deliberations within the Commission and drew in part upon the 
views of internationally recognized experts on human rights law and terror-
ism, as well as the written observations of member states and various NGOs. 
As part of its methodology, the report recognizes that terrorist violence may 
occur in times of peace, in states of emergency, and in situations of armed 
conflict, and therefore examines member states’ obligations under both 
international human rights and international humanitarian law. The report 
considers standards of protection under these legal regimes in six main 
areas: the right to life; the right to humane treatment; the right to personal 
liberty and security; the right to a fair trial; freedom of expression; the right 
to judicial protection and non-discrimination; and the protection of migrants, 
refugees, asylum seekers, and other non-nationals. 
The report makes clear that, in taking measures to prevent, punish, 
and eradicate terrorist violence, states remain bound by their human rights 
obligations in all circumstances, subject only to suspensions and restrictions 
expressly authorized by applicable instruments. The Commission emphasized 
that the terrorist attacks of 11 September, although unprecedented in their 
magnitude, have not changed this basic precept. The Commission also made 
clear that the report would guide it in assessing the anti-terrorism practices of 
all OAS member states. In this connection the Commission, while preparing 
this report, felt it necessary to adopt precautionary measures requesting that 
United States take urgent measures to have the legal status of the detainees 
at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba determined by a competent tribunal.
The Commission’s report was well received by the OAS and has been 
widely disseminated and cited within the United Nations and the Council 
of Europe. In light of the continuing threat of terrorist violence and the 
proliferation of anti-terrorism measures within the region, it is clear that the 
the subject of terrorism will continue to figure prominently on the Com-
mission’s agenda.
Finally, ratification of the American Convention by all OAS member 
states remains an elusive goal and challenge for the system. By virtue of 
the distinctive nature of the region’s human rights arrangements, member 
states are not obliged to ratify the American Convention or other human 
 70. Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, Inter-Am. C.H.R., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/
II.116, doc. 5 rev. 1 corr. (2002).
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rights treaties elaborated by the Organization. The United States, Canada, 
and various Caribbean island states are currently the only members that 
have not yet ratified this instrument. This means that the system established 
under the American Convention, including supervision by the Court, applies 
by and large only to Latin American states. 
This situation is hardly ideal for various reasons. From a human rights 
standpoint, it creates a disadvantage for the inhabitants of non-ratifying 
countries by effectively denying them access to the Court in claims against 
their respective states. From a political standpoint, it also has negative 
consequences, particularly for non-signers. By remaining outside of the 
Convention structure the United States and Canada have increasingly found 
their clout and credibility challenged in the Organization’s political bodies 
when they have pressed various Latin American states to live up to their 
human rights obligations under the American Convention. This was abun-
dantly clear when, during discussions in 1999 concerning possible reform 
of the American Convention, various Latin American governments, led by 
Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, initially sought to exclude the United States and 
Canada from participating in the deliberations because they were not states 
parties to that treaty. 
Moreover, from a policy perspective, it is highly desirable for a region 
that is moving increasingly toward integration in other areas to have all its 
states be bound by the same legal obligations and their peoples have the 
same rights, as well as equal access to the protections offered by both of 
the American Convention’s supervisory organs. In this regard, it is worth 
noting that although the prospects of ratification by Canada in the near 
future have improved, the same, unfortunately, cannot be said in the case 
of the United States, unless the Obama administration seriously pushes for 
the treaty’s ratification.
